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INTRODUCTION
In an environment of mergers, acquisitions, leveraged recapi-
* B.A., U.C. Davis; M.B.A., George Washington; J.D., Tulane Law School. The author
is a member of the New York Bar practicing in the areas of restructurings, venture capital,
and securities. Formerly he was a Vice President in the Venture Division at Silicon Valley
Bank and an Assistant Vice President in Corporate Banking at Security Pacific National
Bank.
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talizations, and spinoffs, the sufficiency of the traditional bond in-
denture has been put to the test.' As a result of some of these
transactions, the market value of selected bonds has been substan-
tially harmed.2 Metropolitan Life lost approximately $40 million
on RJR Nabisco, Inc. bonds as a result of a leveraged buy-out
("LBO").3 Bondholders lost as much as $105 million in the market
value of their holdings of Quantum Chemical debt as a result of a
leveraged recapitalization.4 Even investors in the "High Yield"
bonds of E-II Holdings, Inc. lost $50 million as a result of declining
value after the entity announced its intention to sell certain core
assets.5 In the wake of these types of losses, new attention has been
directed at the sufficiency of traditional bondholder remedies.6
1 An example of the traditional bond indenture is offered in Comm. on Devs. in Bus.
Fin., ABA Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, Model Simplified Indenture,
38 Bus. LAW. 741 (1983).
See Hector, The Bondholders' Cold New World, FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1989, at 83.
Moody's Investors Service estimates that as much as $13 billion was lost by bondholders as
a result of these types of transactions between 1984 and 1988. During that same period, the
rating agency downgraded 254 issues in connection with such extraordinary events. Id.
While not a subject of this paper, the evidence suggests that on balance "corporate take-
overs generate positive gains." See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control:
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 5 (1983).
8 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); see also Farrell, Bondholders are Mad as Hell-And They're Not Going to Take It
Anymore, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 82. However, Metropolitan Life conceded that it earned
as much as $11 million in its equity portfolio in connection with the same transaction. Id.
One recent study valued total shareholder gains from this LBO at $9 billion. See Mohan &
Chen, A Review of the RJR-Nabisco Buyout, 3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 102, 104 (Summer
1990).
" Hector, supra note 2. The relationship between stockholders and bondholders has
been the subject of a number of recent legal articles. See Bratton, Corporate Debt Relation-
ships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L. J. 92; McDaniel, Bondhold-
ers and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413 (1983); Tauke, Should Bonds Have More
Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 1. The plight of bondholders has also received considerable attention in the popular
press. See, e.g., Bleiberg, Bondholders Fight Back, Barrons, Jan. 16, 1989, at 9); Farrell,
supra note 3; Perimuth, Pay Up or Put Up, INsTrrUTiONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1990, at 128;
Sloan, The Rape of the Bondholder, FORBES, Jan. 23, 1989, at 67; Star, High-Yield Bond
Group Lists 'Rights,' PENSIONS AND INVESTMENT AGE, May 29, 1989, at 20.
6 This spinoff case is especially interesting since presumably astute investors purchased
original issue junk debt. See Sloan, supra note 4. High yield bonds (often referred to as
"junk bonds") are those rated BB/Bal and lower by Standard & Poor's and Moody's respec-
tively. Bonds rated "Ba" are "viewed to have some speculative elements; their future cannot
be considered well assured." MOODY'S INVSSTORS SERVICE, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, at iii
(Feb. 1990).
6 In 1988 the Institutional Bondholders Rights Association was established. See
Bleiberg, supra note 4. Bondholders have also moved as a group in demanding innovative
protective covenants. See Star, supra note 4.
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Amongst those who conclude that traditional remedies are inade-
quate, the proposed solution is often the establishment of a fiduci-
ary duty on the part of management for the benefit of bond-
holders.7
This Article provides an overview of the economic conflicts
that fuel the debate over bondholder remedies, an examination of
the sufficiency of traditional remedies, and a consideration of the
need for the imposition of a fiduciary duty.' Spurred by recent
proposals for establishing a fiduciary duty for bondholders,9 this
Article traces the economic arguments favoring a fiduciary duty
through to the most recent legal decisions on the issue. It con-
cludes that while the bond indenture is an imperfect instrument,
fiduciary duty is not a panacea for protection of bondholders from
market value expropriations. Part One considers traditional dis-
tinctions and economic conflicts between shareholders and bond-
holders, setting forth the economic wisdom on shareholder-bond-
holder conflicts and the mechanisms by which bondholder value
may be expropriated. Part Two discusses the scope and sufficiency
of traditional remedies for managing those conflicts, including
fraudulent transfer and legal capital statutes as well as various al-
ternative theories and the bond contract. Part Three considers the
wisdom of the economic and legal arguments for a fiduciary duty.
The arguments will demonstrate that while the proponents of
a fiduciary duty are correct in arguing that much of the basis for
distinctions between stockholder and bondholder remedies is out-
dated, recent decisions in the courts have elected the better course
in rejecting the imposition of a fiduciary duty for bondholders. Re-
7 See Met-Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1524 (classic case proposing fiduciary duty involving
LBO of RJR Nabisco, Inc.).
a Analysis is limited to the sufficiency of remedies for bondholders facing an expropria-
tion of market value. Because of the scope of involvement between trade or other creditors
and the corporation, they may enjoy greater protections at law. Therefore, the fiduciary
duty argument applicable to bondholders is not easily transferable. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(3) (1988) (priority for wage creditors in bankruptcy).
9 The principal proponent of the fiduciary duty argument has been Morey W. McDan-
iel. See McDaniel, supra note 4; McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRP. L.
205 (1988). McDaniel's position is clearly set forth in his 1983 article.
Since fiduciary duties are a substitute for costly contracts, directors should have
fiduciary duties to bondholders as well as to stockholders. The exclusive focus of
corporate law on stockholders is too narrow for modem corporate finance. Bond-
holders and stockholders are all security holders in the enterprise and equally de-
serving of board protection.
McDaniel, supra note 4, at 456.
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jecting such a duty is preferable for several reasons. First, bond-
holders' claims are priced at inception to reflect existing agreed
upon covenant protections. Therefore, absent fraud or other mar-
ket imperfections, the "optimal bond contract" is achieved. 10 Sec-
ond, cost savings from the use of corporate law over express con-
tracts may be illusory. If expropriation risk is addressed in the
indenture, net reduction in agency costs will be minimal, since
both fiduciary and contract actions may be equally expensive to
bring. Lastly, if a fiduciary duty is imposed for the benefit of bond-
holders, directors will be called to the impossible task of resolving
conflicts between their dual obligations to both stockholders and
bondholders. Thus, this Article will conclude that the negotiation
of improved covenants and careful credit pricing is a better objec-
tive than a revolution in bondholder remedies.
I. RELATIONSHIP WITH SHAREHOLDERS
The primary argument in favor of a fiduciary duty for bond-
holders is that historical distinctions between stockholders and
bondholders are outmoded. This position is based on increasing
similarities in the function and character of the two claimants and
the opportunities and incentives stockholders enjoy to expropriate
wealth from bondholders."
A. Historic Distinction
The historic distinction at the root of the bondholder remedies
issue is that shareholders are owners and bondholders are lenders.
This difference is the basis for the use of separate bodies of law for
the protection of each holder's respective interests. As owners, the
shareholder's relationship with the firm is assumed to be dynamic
and to require flexibility.'2 Although shareholders might enter into
contracts with the firm, the unpredictability of future events would
10 Smith and Warner conclude that dividend and financing policy covenants can be
written to control the conflict between shareholders and bondholders and to give "stock-
holders ... incentives to follow a firm-value-maximizing production/investment policy." In
sum, there is a theoretically "optimum bond contract." Smith & Warner, On Financial Con-
tracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 124 (1979).
" See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 398 (3d ed. 1988);
Smith & Warner, supra note 10.
12 However, contemporary financial wisdom has it that the firm does not in fact have
owners in any meaningful sense. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,
88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
1026 [Vol. 65:1023
BONDHOLDERS' RIGHTS
render this approach costly and uncertain.13 Therefore, the rela-
tionship of a shareholder to the firm is best governed by a flexible
corporate law concept of duty.14 This duty is effectuated through
the board of directors as agent for the shareholders. 15 Corporate
law imposes an unwritten duty of loyalty and fiduciary duty on the
directors' management of the firm for the benefit of their agents
and beneficiaries, the shareholders.' 6 Therefore, shareholders rely
on the common-law duty of loyalty and fiduciary duty which are
imposed on directors to protect shareholders' interests in the firm.
Unlike shareholders, bondholders theoretically do not play the
same role in the management of corporate affairs. Therefore, the
legal mechanisms that have evolved for bondholder protection are
less flexible. Furthermore, in many cases these protections simply
do not apply in the absence of fraud, distress, or bankruptcy.
These doctrines include priority rules in bankruptcy,'7 legal capital
requirements,' prohibitions on fraudulent conveyances,' 9 good
faith, tort, and equity theories, 20 and the bond indenture or bond
contract.2' Because of the narrow application of many of these
13 See Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264
(1982). Corporate law is viewed as a more efficient approach to reducing the agency cost of
capital than is the express contract approach: "investors and managers could enter into con-
tractual arrangements designed to minimize divergence of interests. But... this type of
contracting would be very costly. The imposition by the law of fiduciary duties serves as an
alternative or a supplement to hiring direct monitors .... Id.
"4 The need for flexibility in the law that governs the shareholder-firm relationship is
emphasized by Fischel. See id.
15 See Committee of Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking & Business
Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1601 (1978) [hereinafter Corpo-
rate Director's Guidebook] (shareholder-designated corporate director in position of stew-
ardship for owners of enterprise).
16 REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984); see also Corporate Director's Guidebook,
supra note 15. Note, however, that contemporary wisdom finds this agency itself to be costly
in spite of fiduciary duties. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976).
17 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 1129.03 (15th ed. 1991) [hereinafter COLLIER].
2' See B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 59 (2d ed. 1988) (discuss-
ing statutory legal capital schemes that regulate flow of assets to shareholders). "The legal
apparatus built by common law and statute around the concept of 'legal capital' is funda-
mentally aimed at striking a partial accommodation of [the conflict of interests between
owners and creditors]." Id. at 1.
1I State fraudulent conveyance law acts to protect creditors from expropriation of as-
sets. See United States v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del. 1969). The Bankruptcy Code also
protects creditors from fraudulent conveyances. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988).
20 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1507 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
21 See B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 96. The terms "bond indenture" and "bond con-
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remedies, as a general rule the bondholder relies on the bond in-
denture for protection.22
B. Market Realities
A key aspect of the argument for extension of fiduciary duty
to bondholders is that the historic distinctions between stock and
bond investors no longer exist. The function of shareholders and
bondholders has become increasingly similar. Both groups supply
capital to the corporation in return for an expected stream of in-
come.23 The only difference between these investors is in their va-
rying risk/return objectives and expectations. 4 Additionally, the
character of many stock and bond types of instruments is often
indistinguishable, as firms increasingly rely on mezzanine tranches
for funding.25 Mezzanine instruments provide a financing layer be-
tween senior debt and common stock by combining cash flow and
risk characteristics of both.26 Because these instruments have be-
come increasingly homogeneous, it may be argued that legal dis-
tinctions in available remedies also have become outmoded.
C. Conflicting Interests
A second aspect of the argument for a fiduciary duty is that
tract" are used interchangeably.
22 Bondholders are limited to contract remedies in "the absence of fraud, insolvency, or
a violation of a statute." Harif v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133, 134 (Del. 1975); see also Am. B.
FouND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 2 (1971).
22 Fischel, supra note 13, at 1262. This view is best appreciated in the context of the
"nexus of contracts" model of the firm. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 311. "The
private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for
contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization .... " Id. (emphasis
removed).
"' The investor that takes a stock rather than a bond position in the firm has made the
decision to surrender priority in a liquidation and the security of fixed interest and principal
payments in favor of the hope of greater but uncertain dividends and capital gains. See B.
MANNING, supra note 18, at 8.
215 The distinction between debt and equity is also fading in private transactions and
term bank debt. See, e.g., Harvey, Warrants Expand Credit Pricing Options, BANKERS
MAG., May-June 1990, at 44 (equity kickers in senior bank debt).
26 The mezzanine layer lies between senior debt and common equity in the hierarchy of
priority, cash flow, risk, and tax characteristics. It includes such instruments as senior sub-
ordinated, subordinated, debt with warrants, convertibles, options notes, convertible pre-
ferreds, and preferreds. For a discussion of the financing decision with hybrids, see Jones &
Mason, Equity-Linked Debt, 3 MMLAND CoRn. FIN. J. 47, 47-58 (Winter 1986); see also R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 11, at 306-11.
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because of the interdependence of stock and bond values, share-
holders have the ability to expropriate wealth from bondholders.
Therefore, some argue that bondholders should enjoy the same
level and type of protections as stockholders in order to eliminate
the possibility that stockholders will expropriate wealth from
bondholders.
1. Conservation of Value
The interdependence of values that provides shareholders with
opportunities for expropriation is generally explained by the the-
ory of "conservation of value" of the firm. Under this theory,
transfers of firm value between shareholders and bondholders may
arise as a result of the relationship between the value that these
two parties claim on the fixed value of the firm.17 The paradigm for
the valuation of the firm begins with the proposition that the value
of an asset is independent of the value of claims against it. There-
fore, the value of the firm is determined independently of the fi-
nancing decision.28 Value is neither created nor destroyed by the
financing decision; it has been "conserved." Firm value is calcu-
lated by capitalizing the value of sustainable "free cash flows" gen-
erated by operating assets. Free cash flows are those occurring af-
ter required capital expenditures and tax payments are made but
before interest and dividends are paid.29 The second proposition
that describes the interrelationships between claim values is that
the sum of all claims against the asset cannot exceed the value of
the asset.30 Therefore, the value of any single claim is simply the
difference between the value of the firm and the value of other
claims. 31 The value of other claims is best determined on the basis
of a current market value that captures the benefits of favorable
'7 This was first described in an early paper by Modigliani-Miller. See Modigliani &
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am.
EcoN. REV. 261, 264 (June 1958). The Modigliani & Miller model was further refined in a
later paper. See Modigliani & Miller, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 411 (Oct. 1961).
28 This proposition was the basis for a revolution in corporate financial theory and the
basis for the Free Cash Flow model for valuation of the firm. See G.B. STEWART, STERN-
STEWART CORPoRATE FINANcE HANDBOOK 4-1 to 4-8 (Nov. 1986). That model later became
the intellectual basis for the mergers and acquisitions "wave" of the 1980's.
2' Free cash flow is net operating profit after taxes and reinvestment required for sus-
tainability but before financing costs. Id. at 4-2.
80 R. BREALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 11, at 386.
8' Id. at 386-87.
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financing terms.82 For example, if the value of the firm is 100 and
the market value of the bondholder's claim is 60, the value of the
shareholder's residual claim is 40. If stockholders have an opportu-
nity to restructure capitalization such that their value rises from
40 to 70, the value of the bondholder's claim must necessarily drop
from 60 to 30. Thus, bondholder value has been expropriated.
2. Incentives
Incentives to expropriation of bondholder value arise as a re-
sult of the shareholder's potential for unlimited gain with the risk
of loss limited to the amount invested. Although bondholders' risk
of loss is also limited to the amount invested, they do not similarly
enjoy the unlimited potential for gain. Therefore, unlike bondhold-
ers, shareholders enjoy what amounts to an option on the value of
the firm whose exercise price is equal to the payoff costs of all sen-
ior debts.3 3 Unlike commonly traded options, however, sharehold-
ers enjoy control over corporate policy. Shareholders are therefore
able to fashion strategies that increase the possibility of realizing
additional value on their residual claims.3 4 In contrast, bondhold-
ers who value the security of their fixed claim are not in a position
to direct or control the affairs of the corporation.
D. Cases of Expropriation
Examples of expropriation of bondholder value include LBOs,
leveraged recapitalizations, spinoffs, and certain business risk deci-
sions.3 5 In each of these cases, shareholders have elected to pursue
a debt, dividend, or business policy, presumably for the enhance-
3 The market value of debt or preferred claims is subtracted in order to provide for the
effect of changes in interest rate or required return on the value of that claim and therefore
the value of the residual. As a result, fixed rate debt financing leads to a floating residual
value, and floating rate debt financing leads to a fixed residual value. Similarly, increases in
the risk of outstanding debt reduce the value of that claim and therefore enhance the value
of the residual. See G.B. STEWART, supra note 28, at 4-3.
33 This concept was first described by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes in their descrip-
tion of an option pricing model. The option pricing model was originally conceived of in the
corporate balance sheet context. As residual claimants, shareholders are in effect holders of
an option whose exercise price is the payoff cost of senior claims. However, unique to the
corporate context, holders of this option have control over the value of the underlying asset
(the firm). See Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 21 J.
POL. ECON. 35 (1973).
84 R. BRA EaY. & S. MYERs, supra note 11, at 305.
35 See, e.g., supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing LBOs, leveraged recapi-
talizations, and spinoffs).
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ment of their upside value. Therefore, consistent with the principle
of conservation of value, shareholder value is achieved through ex-
propriation of bondholder value .3 Financial theorists divide expro-
priation cases into four general categories: (1) extraordinary divi-
dends; (2) spin offs; (3) increased debt financing (leveraging); and
(4) increased business risk.37
Extraordinary dividends and spinoffs expropriate shareholder
value by "stealing away" assets of the firm. Extraordinary divi-
dends include self tenders, share repurchase programs, and cash
distributions.3 8 These extraordinary dividends increase the finan-
cial leverage of the firm by reducing total assets and shareholders'
equity. Because the bondholder's claim is fixed, it represents a
greater percentage of the remaining asset base. Therefore, credit
risk for bondholders is increased and their claims are discounted.39
Again, consistent with the theory of conservation of value, the
market value of the firm's stock decreases by less than the amount
of the distribution. This is because the decline in the firm's value
is shared with the bondholders. 4 0 As a result, shareholders enjoy a
transfer or expropriation of value from bondholders. Spinoffs may
operate in much the same way as extraordinary dividends since
they also involve a distribution to shareholders. In most spinoff
transactions, financial leverage increases and the bondholder's
claim is made more risky.41 Therefore, the bondholder's claim is
discounted for the benefit of the post-spinoff shareholder, who
holds shares of two entities, the sum of which is presumably more
valuable than is the single pre-spinoff claim.
Increased leveraging and certain business decisions may also
expropriate bondholder value. Financial leveraging expropriates
88 Because bondholder losses may be offset with stockholder gains, some have suggested
that investors "immunize" their positions by holding both. This suggestion has led some
issuers to structure claims in "strips" or "units" of both debt and equity that are not sepa-
rable/detachable. Interview with Joel Stem, President, Stem-Stewart Management Com-
pany, in Tarrytown, New York (June 1987).
'7 Smith and Warner classify these as (1) dividend policy, (2) claim dilution, (3) asset
substitution, and (4) under-investment. See Smith & Warner, supra note 10, at 119.
33 In each case, assets of the firm are distributed to shareholders. See R. BREALEY & S.
MYERS, supra note 11, at 358-60.
3" Id. at 390-94.
40 See id. at 358-60; see also Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflicts and Dividend
Constraints, 10 J. FrN. ECON. 211, 212 (1982).
41 This occurs because assets are stolen away from the corporation while bondholders'
claims remain the same. See Galai & Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk
Factor of Stock, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 53, 69-70 (1976).
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value from bondholders in the same way as extraordinary divi-
dends by increasing the proportion of debt to total assets.42 Again,
the credit risk of the original bonds is increased, and their market
value is reduced. 43 Therefore, the market value of the shareholder's
claim is enhanced by the amount of value lost by bondholders."
Value is expropriated from bondholders for the benefit of share-
holders. Lastly, certain business decisions that alter business risk
may operate in the same way as does leveraging.45 In this case, be-
cause the bondholder's claim is fixed, any benefits of the more
risky venture accrue to the shareholders.46 The bondholder's claim
is discounted with the increased risk-adjusted capitalization rate
and therefore reduced in value. The shareholder enjoys the benefit
of both the possibility of gain from the success of the risky new
venture as well as the expropriated bondholder value occurring as
a result of credit deterioration. 7
II. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
As a result of the modern relationship between bondholders
and stockholders, new attention has been given to bondholders'
remedies against market value expropriation. A central aspect of
the argument for a fiduciary duty to bondholders is that those
traditional remedies are now insufficient.48
A. Priority
A basic assumption in pricing and structuring dealings in
bonds is that bondholders are senior in rank to shareholders.
Bondholders' claims to the firm enjoy priority over those of share-
holders. In its most basic form, the rule of priority provides that
bondholders will be paid before residual values are distributed to
11 R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 11, at 421-26, 431-36; see also Myers,
Determinates of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 147 (1977) ("paper predicts that
corporate borrowing is inversely related to the proportion of market value accounted for by
real options"). Losses to bondholders as a result of unanticipated leveraging abound. See
Hector, supra note 2.
43 R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 11, at 390.
44 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
" Smith and Warner point out that this phenomenon may be strong enough to induce
stockholders to engage in new business ventures that actually reduce the value of the firm.
See Smith & Warner, supra note 10, at 119 n.4.
48 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
" Smith & Warner, supra note 10, at 119 n.4.
48 See McDaniel, supra note 4, at 434-35.
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shareholders. 49 Therefore, shareholders will not be permitted to
"steal away" the assets of the corporation upon which the bond-
holders rely. Although the rule has been invoked time and again in
the bankruptcy context,50 its simplicity is deceptive. Application in
bankruptcy is appropriate because bankruptcy law requires that
assets be valued and claims retired according to priority.51 How-
ever, this rule is of less use in the case of an ongoing business in
which residual values are only an intellectual concept.52 In this
case, assets are not valued or liquidated and claims are intended to
remain outstanding. Therefore, priority rules offer bondholders lit-
tle protection against expropriation of value in the case of a going
concern.
B. Legal Capital
The concept of legal capital is aimed at striking a balance be-
tween the interests of shareholders and bondholders in the case of
a going concern."3 Legal capital statutes are embodied in state cor-
porate law. 4 Such statutes generally provide that the firm shall
make no distribution to shareholders if "after giving it effect: (1)
the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they became
due..., or (2) the corporation's total assets would be less than the
sum of its total liabilities."55 While the terms of such statutes are
construed broadly for the protection of creditors,56 they are gener-
4' No distribution may be made to shareholders unless there is a surplus of assets over
the liabilities of the corporation. Wood v. Dumner, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824)
(No. 17,944); see also B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 27-30 (discussing import of Wood case
and limitation on distribution of assets to shareholders). But see Harvey, Application of the
New Money Exception in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 275 (1991)
(discussing application of new money exception to rule of absolute priority).
50 See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) ("absolute prior-
ity rule"); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (all interested
parties, including bondholders, entitled to court's protection).
51 See COLLIER, supra note 17.
51 See B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 30.
53 See B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 1. "The legal apparatus built by common law and
statute around the concept of 'legal capital' is fundamentally aimed at striking a partial
accommodation of that conflict of interests [between owners and creditors]." Id.
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 506 (McKin-
ney's 1986).
8" Rv. MoDnL Bus. CORP. AcT § 6.40(c) (1990).
56 A "distribution" includes virtually any transfer of money. An inability to pay "debts
as they become due," involves a pro forma analysis of expected cash flows ("Equity Insol-
vency Test"). An insufficiency of assets over liabilities is determined based on any valuation
methodology that is reasonable in the circumstances ("Balance Sheet Test"). Id. § 6.40 corn-
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ally an ineffective means of protection from market value expropri-
ations from bondholders. Because legal capital prohibitions only
limit distributions that lead to insolvency, they only come to play
in egregious circumstances. In most cases, a bondholder has exper-
ienced significant market value expropriation long before the cor-
poration approached either equity or balance sheet insolvency.
Therefore, legal capital statutes provide little protection against
market value expropriations from bondholders.
C. Fraudulent Transfers
Federal and state laws impose limitations against transfers of
assets by firms that are or may become insolvent.51 Generally,
these statutes prohibit transfers of assets by firms for less than ad-
equate consideration when the transferor is either insolvent or be-
comes insolvent.58 Fraudulent transfer statutes provide a remedy
upon a showing of both a transfer for inadequate consideration and
some type of insolvency. The requirement of a transfer for inade-
quate consideration is satisfied in cases involving share repur-
chases, dividends, or distributions in which the firm receives no
consideration." However, because few expropriations occur when a
firm is on the brink of insolvency, the independent requirement of
insolvency renders those statutes of little use in market value ex-
propriation scenarios. Furthermore, because borrowings are gener-
ally made for fair consideration, in those cases in which expropria-
tion occurs as a result of unanticipated leveraging, fraudulent
transfer laws will present the twin hurdles of showing unfair con-
sideration and insolvency. 0
ment 1-4.
'5 See, e.g., DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301-1312 (1974) (Delaware's adoption of Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act).
" Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a transfer is recoverable if it both is
made without adequate consideration and causes the transferor to be left with inadequate
assets to operate the business, leaves the transferor without adequate assets to pay debt as
they become due, or renders the transferor insolvent. UNn?. FRAuD. TRANs. ACT § 4, 7A
U.L.A. 652 (1985).
69 Id. § 3 comment.
0 As a general rule, this theory requires a showing both that the amount borrowed or
advanced was unfair consideration in view of the amount of security given and that this
transfer rendered the firm insolvent. In certain extraordinary circumstances, the require-
ment of unfair consideration has been found to be satisfied in cases involving LBOs. This
should, however, be viewed as the exception. See United States v. Gleneagles Investment
Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983); cf. Galen, Is There Sweet Revenge for Deals that Go
Sour?, Bus. WK., Mar. 19, 1990, at 132 (some bondholders encouraged by recent federal case
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D. Alternative Theories
In addition to the several traditional creditors' rights theories,
attempts have been made to argue cases on the bases of the im-
plied covenant of good faith, unjust enrichment, and intentional
interference with contract. As a general rule, these theories were
intended to address much different types of scenarios and thus
have failed to provide relief from market value expropriation.
The issue of the implied covenant of good faith, recognized in
contract law, has been raised when shareholder actions were con-
trary to the express terms or purpose of the indenture.6 1 However,
because these claims must be based on the express terms of the
indenture, they often fail.2 Convertible bondholders have success-
fully argued this theory when denied express conversion privi-
leges.6 3 Convertible bondholders have also successfully argued this
theory when denied an interest in shares of a subsidiary being
spun-off.64 However, unlike those cases in which bondholders had
an expectancy to the equity of the firm, in most cases a nexus be-
tween the action being taken and the purpose or terms of the bond
contract is lacking.
Lastly, theories such as unjust enrichment and intentional in-
terference with contract have also been difficult to sustain. Unjust
enrichment has been rejected because the absence of a contract be-
tween the parties is a prerequisite to such a finding.6 5 Intentional
interference with contract has failed on the basis of the require-
ment of a separate showing of breach of contract.6 In sum, be-
cause of the unique requirements of each of these alternative theo-
ries, they generally provide bondholders with little protection in
classic market value expropriation scenarios.
law).
61 See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1983).
" See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976, 994 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
"3 See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1977), afl'd, 444 U.S. 472
(1980).
" See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp., 680 F.2d at 941.
65 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. at 994 (unjust enrichment applies only
when no contract between parties exists); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 1504, 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Chadirjian v. Kanian, 123 A.D.2d 596, 598, 506
N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (2d Dep't 1986).
66 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. at 995.
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E. Bond Contract
Because of difficulties in utilizing the theories discussed above
in cases involving market value expropriation, bondholders typi-
cally rely on the bond contract or indenture. The potential suffi-
ciency of the indenture for the protection of interests is the focus
of considerable debate. The debate as to the sufficiency of the
bond contract turns on two issues: first, whether an indenture can
be designed to control adequately the actions of management with-
out unnecessarily constraining its managerial discretion; and sec-
ond, whether protections or their absence are adequately priced in
the credit ultimately extended.8
Modern bond contracts or indentures are often more abbrevi-
ated than might be expected. 8 Typical covenants in "real world"
indentures dealing with the possibility of market value expropria-
tion include: (1) prohibitions against secured or prior debt (includ-
ing sale-leasebacks) intended to protect against "stealing away" of
corporate assets; (2) covenants regarding further indebtedness that
protect against increased leveraging; and (3) limitations on distri-
butions to shareholders that protect against payment of extraordi-
nary dividends or share repurchases."9 Although historically many
other important covenants that would protect bondholders were
often omitted or not fully employed,70 the current trend among in-
vestment grade debt issuers has been toward providing an increas-
ing level of protection for bondholders. 71 Therefore, the question of
the need for a fiduciary duty appears to turn on whether the cur-
67 As to these twin issues, some have posed the possibility of an "optimal bond con-
tract." See Smith & Warner, supra note 10, at 124; cf. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 614 (1984) ("more effective contractual
provision[s] will secure a higher price [for the issuer]"). However, others reject it as not
being "real world." McDaniel, supra note 4, at 428 n.77 ("pursuit of an optimal bond con-
tract is doomed to failure").
" See generally Comm. on Devs. in Bus. Fin., supra note 1 (discussing traditional
indentures).
69 See B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 96-98.
70 Some surveys on indentures have found a permissive attitude toward covenant pro-
tection. See Am. BAR FOUND., supra note 22, at 350, 434, 369, 402. In another survey of 87
indentures taken between 1974 and 1975, 91% had restricted the issuance of additional
debt, 23% restricted dividends, 39% restricted merger activities, and 36% restricted the
disposition of assets. See Smith & Warner, supra note 10, at 122-23; see also McDaniel,
supra note 4, at 424-25 (discussing restrictive covenants).
71 A recent survey found that at least 37% of investment grade debt issuers have in-
cluded some level of protection from market value expropriation in bonds issued during the
last two years. Seven percent claimed they provided "strong" protection. Is Anyone Paying
Any Heed to Bondholders?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1991, at 123.
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rent and evolving state of the bond contract is an efficient way to
manage the risk of market value expropriation and whether the
risks the parties elect to underwrite are properly priced in the
credit.
III. THE CASE FOR A FIDUCIARY DUTY
The case for a fiduciary duty is being considered on two
fronts. Corporate finance theorists are engaged in an economic
analysis of the efficiency of bond contracting, and the legal com-
munity is arguing the merits of the case.
A. Basic Economic Case
The economic argument for a fiduciary duty is that the new
dynamic in stockholder-bondholder relationships would render a
flexible concept of fiduciary duty the least expensive approach to-
ward protecting all investors' interests. This argument has four
components. First, in modern capital markets, the interrelation-
ships between competing claims of stockholders and bondholders
and the option for unlimited gain that stockholders enjoy provide
stockholders with both the opportunity and the incentive to expro-
priate value from bondholders. Second, the use of existing reme-
dies for the protection of bondholders has failed because tradi-
tional remedies do not address the effect of changes in the risk of
the firm. Third, the bond indenture cannot be adequately adapted
to protect bondholders because of the high cost of express con-
tracting and the lack of perfect foresight.72 Fourth, the inadequacy
of remedies leads to a higher cost of capital that would not be pre-
sent if the lesser cost fiduciary duty were imposed for the benefit
of bondholders. 3
B. Rebuttal to Economic Case
Although the first several assumptions in the argument are
well supported, the basis for others is less clear.
1. Optimal Bond Contract
Whether existing remedies can be adapted to address the ex-
propriation problem is largely contingent upon achieving an ade-
72 See infra note 75.
73 See McDaniel, supra note 4, at 447-48.
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quate bond contract. This possibility is posed by financial theorists
who find that there is, in fact, an optimal level of covenants "which
maximize the value of the firm. 74 This belief conflicts with the
component of the economic argument which finds that existing
remedies cannot be applied sufficiently to address the stockholder-
bondholder conflict.76 If an optimal level of covenants exists and if
both parties price their dealings correctly, the bond contract is by
definition being applied sufficiently to address the problem of mar-
ket value expropriation. The best evidence that debt instruments
are being sufficiently priced is that lenders continue to come back
for more.
The conflict over the sufficiency of the bond contract may be a
distinction without a difference. In some cases, confusion exists
over the separate issues of (1) the possibility of an optimal bond
contract and (2) the possibility that a fiduciary duty would be less
expensive than that optimal bond contract.7 It is essential to dis-
tinguish between these issues in the analysis. Notwithstanding the
deficiencies in specific cases, an optimal bond contract is by defini-
tion the current state of the art." An optimal bond contract is no
more than that unique set of covenants that reflect the cost of con-
tracting, the parties' expectations for the future, and required re-
7" That optimal level of covenant protection occurs when the costs of negotiating, moni-
toring, and enforcing covenants is equal to the value added to the debt holders' claim as a
result of reduced agency costs accruing from enhanced protections. See Smith & Warner,
supra note 10, at 152-53.
7 McDaniel flatly rejects the notion of an optimal bond contract. See McDaniel, supra
note 4, at 428.
The possibility of an innovative bond contract that dramatically reduces the po-
tential for opportunism by junior security holders has been implied. If such a
bond contract were possible, it surely would have been invented in the last 100
years. The pursuit of an optimal bond contract is doomed to failure.
Id. at 428 n.77 (citation omitted).
76 McDaniel commingles the issues of optimal contract and comparative costs. He ar-
gues that even a "rough approximation of the optimal bond contract is out of the question."
Id. at 428. He attributes this to costly contracting and lack of perfect foresight. Id. However,
costly contracting is not an issue of contracting costs vis-a-vis a less costly nonexistent alter-
native such as fiduciary duty. It is an issue of at what point the parties will elect to stop
demanding covenants and underwrite the risk of expropriation by pricing the credit appro-
priately. It is a concept of equilibrium and efficiency in the negotiations. Smith and Warner
identify "optimum" only within the universe of contract remedies. See Smith & Warner,
supra note 10, at 152-53.
77 "It appears that the Costly Contracting Hypothesis, which explains how firms reduce
the costs of the bondholder-stockholder conflict, helps to account for the variation in debt
contracts across firms." Smith & Warner, supra note 10, at 124.
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turns."8 The contention that such a contract exists is a statement
that the contracting process between the lender and the borrower
is efficient. Each bond contract reflects an equilibrium between
covenant protections, costs, and required returns. On this narrow
issue alone, those arguing for a fiduciary duty offer little in
opposition. 9
In recent years a number of market developments have added
to the evidence in support of the optimal bond contract. Innova-
tive "event risk" clauses increasingly are being negotiated.80 When
protections from expropriation are not provided for in the inden-
ture, optimization is obtained through increased pricing.sl The in-
stitutionalization of this mechanism is reflected in the creation of
"event risk" ratings by Moody's Investors Service.8 2 Whatever the
outcome of the debate, it is unrealistic to conclude flatly that ex-
isting remedies such as the indenture are not or cannot be struc-
tured to manage expropriation risk adequately. The focus instead
should be on what constitutes adequate protection and the com-
parative costs of that protection.
2. Comparative Costs
Probably the most important component of the fiduciary duty
argument is that imposition of the new duty is a cost-effective sub-
stitute for costly contracts.8 3 Despite this contention, there has
been little empirical work on the issue. Cost savings from the use
of implied remedies rather than express contracts may be illusory.
78 Id. at 119-21.
7' "If such a contract were possible, it surely would have been invented in the last 100
years." McDaniel, supra note 4, at 428 n.77.
80 The use of such covenants has become firm policy for certain institutional lenders.
Metropolitan Life requires "event risk" clauses in all new indentures and loan agreements.
Interview with John R. Endres, Investment Analyst, Corporate Investments, Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, in Houston, Texas (Feb. 13, 1990).
$1 As a result of the magnitude of expropriations that have occurred, see supra note 2,
unmanaged "event risk" mandates an incremental premium for high grade corporate issuers..
Evidence of that premium includes (a) the pricing of comparable instruments with and
without "event risk" clauses and (b) the shift to asset backed paper when "event risk" is
less of an issue. Interview with James A. Parrish, Associate Director, Structured Finance,
Moody's Investors Service, in New York City (Mar. 2, 1990); see also Perimuth, supra note
4 (more issuers now offer event risk protection).
82 See Perimuth, supra note 4.
s See McDaniel, supra note 4, at 455-56. "Since fiduciary duties are a substitute for
costly contracts, directors should have fiduciary duties to bondholders as well as to stock-
holders." Id. at 456.
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Two components of the comparative costs between express
contracting and fiduciary duties are recognized, namely, enforce-
ment costs and agency costs.8 4 First, little evidence exists sug-
gesting that contract enforcement costs are greater than fiduciary
duty enforcement costs. A shareholders' derivative suit is as expen-
sive as a contract action. Therefore, it is uncertain whether any
enforcement cost benefit is derived from imposition of a fiduciary
duty. Second, the issue of whether agency costs are greater under a
contract-only regimen as opposed to under a fiduciary duty mecha-
nism is also uncertain. Some argue that because of inevitable insuf-
ficiencies in the indenture covenants, which are viewed as either
too crude or too lenient, agency costs under an exclusive contract
remedy are greater.8 5 Therefore, some argue that under a fiduciary
duty standard managerial deviations would be less.
The argument that agency costs are lower under a fiduciary
duty regimen turns on the assumptions that agency costs attribu-
table to the gaps in the indenture are greater than those attributa-
ble to the ambiguous unwritten concept of fiduciary duty, and that
because no optimal bond contract exists, the bond contract does in
fact have significant gaps. Proponents of a fiduciary duty offer lit-
tle in support of either of these propositions. As to the issue of
whether the agency costs attributable to the incomplete monitor-
ing of an indenture are greater than those associated with a fiduci-
ary duty, no clear evidence has been put forth. As to the question
of whether a bond contract can be sufficiently drafted and priced,
there are at least conflicting views. In sum, the most important
components of the fiduciary duty argument either lack support or
are at best supported by conflicting evidence.
3. Conflicting Obligations
A final and key aspect of the argument for a fiduciary duty is
the assumption that the directors and managers of a firm could
simultaneously serve the twin masters of the stockholders and the
bondholders. Perhaps the most compelling argument against the
imposition of a fiduciary duty for the benefit of bondholders is the
practical unworkability of this assumption. In those many deci-
sions in which the interests of both parties conflict,8 6 management
4 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 328-29.
" See McDaniel, supra note 4, at 429.
" Cases abound in which the interests of creditors and owners conflict. Owners are
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would be paralyzed by its irreconcilable obligations. 87 It is unrealis-
tic to assume that a single fiduciary could concurrently serve the
interest of two parties that are so adversarial. The fiduciary duty
argument fails to address the practical aspects of the proposed
duties.
C. Legal Case
The legal case for a fiduciary duty has evolved through several
decisions to its most recent rejection in Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc."s
1. Background
In the 1980 case of Broad v. Rockwell International Corp.,89
the Fifth Circuit held that while shareholders have a fiduciary
duty to holders of convertible bonds,90 that duty is satisfied when
the firm complies with the letter of the bond indenture.91 The re-
sult of this holding is seemingly contradictory. The court found a
fiduciary duty on one hand but limited it to the express terms of
the indenture on the other. Furthermore, it might be argued that
the holding is limited only to cases involving convertible debt. In
the 1975 case of Harff v. Kerkorian,9 2 the Delaware Supreme Court
reversed a decision denying fiduciary duty as a remedy for bond-
holders who had experienced an expropriation. 3 Rather than im-
pose a fiduciary duty, the court elected to provide relief under the
theory of fraud."' Although this case rejects fiduciary duty, a simi-
lar result is achieved through the alternative theory of fraud. In
generally in favor of dividends and higher return business strategies. Creditors favor the
retention of earnings and the less risky course. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra
note 11, at 348.
:, This conflict was described by one commentator as a false premise in the argument
for a fiduciary duty to bondholders. "The false premise is that requiring directors to make
decisions in the best interests of the 'corporation as a whole' will somehow overcome the
inherent tension between investor groups. In fact, the tension cannot be so easily over-
come." Tauke, supra note 4, at 59.
88 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
94 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
80 Id. at 430.
91 Id. at 431.
92 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975) (per curiam).
3 Id. at 134.
" Id. Expropriation occurred as a result of an extraordinary dividend executed in com-
pliance with the terms of the indenture. Id. at 133.
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the 1977 case of Green v. Hamilton9 5 a district court considered
whether the deferral of a merger announcement until after the
bondholder's equity conversion date was permissible."' In ruling
for the bondholders, the court held that bondholders were among
the community of interests to whom the directors owed a fiduciary
duty. 7 In that case, the court suggested that the imposition of a
fiduciary duty is not reserved for convertible debt cases.9 8
Generally, each of these earlier cases was marked by bond-
holders who held a contingent stockholder's interest (convertible
bonds). Therefore, notwithstanding the dictum in Green that the
theory is not reserved for convertible debt, it is difficult to argue
that these cases necessarily stood for the proposition that straight
bondholders enjoy the benefit of an unambiguous fiduciary.
Whatever the appropriate conclusion, most ambiguity in New York
was resolved in 1989 by Metropolitan Life."'
2. Metropolitan Life v. RJR Nabisco
Metropolitan Life effectively ended the viability of fiduciary
duty as a theory for sophisticated bondholders in New York. The
case arose in connection with the decision by the board of directors
of RJR Nabisco, Inc. to accept a $24 billion bid for the LBO of the
company. The deal was financed with roughly $19 billion in new
debt. Metropolitan Life brought suit claiming that as a result of
the transaction it had suffered an expropriation of $40 million in
the market value of its RJR Nabisco, Inc. bonds. 100
The suit alleged a host of theories for recovery, including
breach of good faith, fraud, unjust enrichment, tortious interfer-
ence with contract, fraudulent conveyances, and breach of fiduci-
ary duties.' The district court held in favor of RJR Nabisco on all
counts. First, the court found no breach of good faith since the
parties had not been deprived of the benefit of their bargains, and
the buy-out was not inconsistent with the terms of the inden-
ture. 0 2 Second, the issue of fraud was not pleaded with sufficient
437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Id. at 726.
Id. at 729 n.4 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939)).
See id.; see also McDaniel, supra note 4, at 413-21.
,' 716 F. Supp. at 1524-25.
100 Id. at 1506.
101 Id. at 1507 n.6.
102 Id. at 1526.
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particularity. 10 3 Third, no unjust enrichment was found because
the plaintiff had "not alleged a violation of ... the indentures at
issue,"'104 and the circumstances were not such that "in equity and
good conscience the defendant should make restitution." 05 Fourth,
the court found no tortious interference with contract because
there was no evidence of a frustration of either the purpose or
terms of the contract, and no event that rendered the contract
worthless to any one party. 06 Fifth, the issue of fraudulent convey-
ances had not been pleaded with sufficient particularity. 0 7 Last, on
the issue of breach of fiduciary duty, the court held that bondhold-
ers "are not entitled to such additional protections."' 08
The analysis of the fiduciary duty issue was brief. In response
to the defendants' attempt to invoke Delaware law, which unam-
biguously rejected fiduciary duty for bondholders,109 the court con-
cluded that though the more ambiguous New York law was appli-
cable, Delaware had the better rule. Therefore, the court held that
the Delaware rule was persuasive in New York.110 The court ex-
plained its reasoning in favor of bringing the Delaware rule into
New York on the basis of what it saw as the extraordinary charac-
ter of the fiduciary obligation. In its analysis, the court invoked
language from the 1928 seminal New York case of Meinhard v.
Salmon rendered by then Chief Judge Cardozo."'
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Un-
compromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty .... 112
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1523.
105 Id. at 1522 (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank v. Banque Intra, S.A., 274 F. Supp. 496,
499 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
108 Id. at 1523.
107 Id. at 1526.
108 Id. at 1525.
109 Id. at 1524 (citing Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988)). In Simons, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the corporate bond represents a contractual entitlement
and does not represent an equitable interest that is "necessary for the imposition of a trust
relationship with concomitant fiduciary duties." Simons, 549 A.2d at 303.
110 See Met-Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1524.
" Id. (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)).
Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
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The court in Metropolitan Life offered little explanation of its ap-
plication of Cardozo's view of the fiduciary relationship. It limited
its opinion to the following conclusory statement:
Before a court recognizes the duty of a "punctilio of an honor
most sensitive," it must be certain that the complainant is enti-
tled to more than the 'morals of the marketplace'. . . . This court
has concluded that plaintiffs presently before it-sophisticated
investors who are unsecured creditors-are not entitled to such
additional protections.113
There is no explanation why "this court has concluded" that Met-
ropolitan Life as a bondholder is not deserving of a fiduciary duty.
In the final analysis, notwithstanding the brevity of its explana-
tion, the court in Metropolitan Life effectively eliminated the via-
bility of fiduciary duty as a theory for recovery by sophisticated
bondholders in cases governed by New York law.114
CONCLUSION
The argument for the imposition of a fiduciary duty to protect
bondholders is driven by twin revolutions in financial theory and
in the financial markets. These revolutions create substantial in-
centives for the expropriation of market value from bondholders
that are often not addressed by traditional legal remedies. How-
ever, the evidence suggests that the imposition of a fiduciary duty
for the benefit of bondholders may be unjustified. First, there is
evidence that the bond contract may be adapted and priced to ad-
dress the risk of expropriation of market value without unnecessa-
rily constraining managerial discretion to pursue a wealth-maxi-
mizing strategy. Second, the question of whether a fiduciary duty
is less costly than a contract remedy has not been sufficiently re-
solved. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the question of how
management would reconcile dual obligations to stockholders and
bondholders has not been answered. As a result, the New York de-
cision in Metropolitan Life, which rejects fiduciary duty as a the-
ory of recovery for bondholders, offers the better course for other
jurisdictions still considering the issue.
113 Met-Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1525.
114 The proposition that fiduciary duty is no longer a viable theory after Met-Life is
supported by the fact that in a case occurring six months later before the same court, in-
volving similar facts, bondholders elected not even to plead the theory. See Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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